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In recognition of skill: the growth 
of qualification payments, 1960-1980. 
Pat Walsh* 
The initial development of qualification payments was related to efforts by craft 
unions to overcome the decline in margins for skill. During the 1970s, the emphasis 
widened to include a campaign to use qualification payments to evade wage controls. 
As a result, some non-trades groups pressed successfully for qualification payments or 
their equivalents to restore lost relativity with tradesmen. Their successes, most notably 
at Tasman and Kinleith, worked against the initial craft union strategy of using such 
payments to restore skill margins. 
Get as many qualifications as you can, my boy. You don't need them now, but one 
never knows- Francois Mauriac. 
Introduction 
One of the most significant developments in the New Zealand bargaining system be-
tween 1960 and 1980 was the swift growth in the importance of payments other than the 
basic hourly or weekly wage. In 1960 most workers were automatically entitled to the 
basic wage only, although there was also a limited range of special payments applicable 
where certain specified conditions of work prevailed. Over the next 2 decades, however, 
the bargaining focus widened considerably to include payments other than the basic wage. 
By 1980, for many workers these payments comprised a significant proportion of total 
income. The most important of these were qualification payments for skilled tradesmen, 
service entitlements, and other uniformly applicable payments such as site or disability 
allowances, special payments, travelling money, bonuses and industry allowances. In 
addition, the scope and size of variable payments for particular working conditions were 
substantially greater by 1980 than had been the case 20 years before. 
These changes necessarily altered the character of wage bargaining in New Zealand. 
No longer were union and employer negotiators concerned almost exclusively with the 
basic wage. By 1980 this was only 1 decreasingly important component of a total re-
muneration package. As a result, wage bargaining acquired a complexity absent in earlier 
years, and conflict over payments other than the basic wage became a prominent feature 
of the industrial relations system. This article examines the development and implications 
of 1 of these changes in the bargaining system - the growth of qualification payments to 
skilled tradesmen. During the 1960s, qualification payments became established for the 
first time in almost all trades awards and industrial agreements. The initial introduction 
and spread of these payments stemmed from the growing dissatisfaction expressed by 
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craft unions with the gradual erosion of the margin between the wages paid to skilled 
tradesmen and those paid to semi-skilled and unskilled workers. This factor remained 
important during the 1970s. However, in that decade, the further growth of qualification 
payments and the extension of comparable payments to groups other than skilled trades-
men became part of a wider trade union strategy to circumvent official wage controls. 
The decline in margins for skill 
By the 1960s, the operation of the arbitration system had led to a levelling out of the 
wage structure in terms of both skill and inter-industry differentials (Carpenter, 1969 ; 
Martin, 1974). The position with regard to skill differentials was well summarised by the 
Federation of Labour in 1965 when it took a case (see below) to the Arbitration Court 
requesting that it make a general pronouncement on the percentage margin that should 
apply between skilled and unskilled workers (Fol, 1965). In its submission to the Court, 
the FOL identified 4 occupational categories : skilled tradesmen ; unskilled workers in the 
wholesale and retail trade ; other unskilled workers ; and general labourers. The FOL's 
data revealed that between 1909 and 1965 the wages of skilled tradesmen had increased at 
by far the lowest rate of these 4 occupational categories. As a result, the skilled 
craftsman's margin over the general labourer had declined from 34.9 percent in 1909 to 
19.4 percent in 1965, whereas the other 2 unskilled categories, both of which had been 
paid at rates below the general labourer in 1909 had improved sufficiently to establish 
margins of 11.1 and 9.1 percent respectively above the general labourer in 1965. 
The Arbitration Court's Standard Wage Pronouncements (SWPs) had been crucial in 
accounting for this erosion in margins for skill. Between 1919 and 1952 the Arbitration 
Court issued 8 SWPs in which it indicated the wage levels it considered appropriate for 
skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers. Unlike General Wage Orders (GWOs), these had 
no immediate effect on wage levels, but served as a clear guideline to union and employer 
negotiators in conciliation councils as to what settlement the Court would issue, should an 
award go before it. The effect of SWPs was two-fold. They fixed a stable hierarchy of 
relative wages which became the central consideration in all wage bargaining, and, 
secondly, they enabled the Court to exercise a high degree of control over wage negotia-
tions. As Martin observes, SWPs "effectively placed conciliation proceedings in a strait-
jacket : a settlement was virtually pre-determined" (1974, p.261 ). SWPs compressed 
percentage margins for skill. They set monetary margins between the 3 skill categories, 
and as wages increased over time, these became a decreasing proportion of the total wage 
(see Table 1). Due to the influence of SWPs on wage negotiations those monetary margins 
were reflected in the wage levels set in awards and industrial agreements. 
Table 1 Percentage margin between skilled and unskilled rates specified by Standard 
Wage Pronouncements 
Source: 
Year 
1919 
1920 
1925 
1937 
1945 
1947 
1949 
1952 
Percentage margin 
25.8 
26.3 
22.7 
17.9 
15.9 
14.7 
14.6 
16.5 
Margins between wage rates paid for skilled and unskilled labour (Federation of Labour, 
August 1960) . 
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In the 1965 margins for skill case, the FOL noted also that the margin of 25.8 percent 
set by the first SWP in 1919 had been unusually low, following an average pre-World War I 
margin of 36.4 percent. It further observed that the practice of maintaining the linkage 
between the skilled worker and the general labourer, whose wages had fallen considerably 
below those of other unskilled categories, had compounded the unfavourable treatment 
accorded to the skilled craftsman. The FOL concluded that as a result of those two factors, 
"skilled workers have suffered the double disadvantage of a contracted margin calculated 
on a depreciated base" (FOL, 1965, p.24). Other factors had also been important in 
eroding skill margins. These included the money ceiling upon the application of GWOs, 
the practice of increasing award wages by a fairly uniform monetary adjustment rather 
than by a percentage amount and, in the post-World War 2 period, the competitive bidding 
by employers for scarce semi-skilled and unskilled labour. It is also likely that tradesmen 
were disadvantaged by the less aggressive bargaining approach of the craft unions com-
pared with those unions representing less skilled workers. 
The decline in margins for skill had been a cause of concern to the craft unions for 
some time before the 1960s, and it is evident that the Arbitration Court shared this con-
cern. But such efforts as it engaged in during the 1950s to remedy the situation were 
singularly ineffectual and lacking in initiative. The 1952 SWP, for example, made only a 
minor difference to margins for skill, and failed to restore the margins prevailing before 
World War 2 (see Table 1 ). As criticism grew in the early 1960s, the Department of Labour 
defended the Court, claiming it had addressed the issue in the 1956 metal trades award 
(Labour and Employment Gazette, November 1962, p.28). However, as the memorandum 
to that award makes plain, (56, BA, 165), the Court had in fact confined itself to follow-
ing the settlement already reached in conciliation in the motor trades award (56, BA, 97), 
and had failed to take any initiative itself. In July 1960, in response to the alarm being 
expressed at the continued compression of margins for skill, the FOL covened an ad hoc 
committee of representatives from craft unions to examine the issue (FOL Conference 
minutes, 1961, pp.48-9). The campaign to reverse the declining position of the skilled 
tradesmen became the central issue of concern to the craft unions during the 1960s. 
Trades certificate and advanced trades certificate 
However, it was 6 years before the craft unions were able to achieve a partial restora-
tion of skill margins by securing a substantial increase in the basic wage rate for skilled 
tradesmen. Their initial successes were confined solely to obtaining qualification 
payments. In 1960 these were rare. No award included a payment for trades certificate, 
while only 2 major awards recognised advanced trades certificate. The first payment for 
advanced trades certificate had been included in the Marlborough, Nelson, Westland and 
Canterbury Electrical Supply Authorities' (ESA) award in 1956 (56, BA, 303). This 
payment (2.5 cents or 3d per hour) was extended to the Marlborough (etc) Electrical 
Workers' award in 1958 (58, BA, 865). Then, in 1961, a payment for advanced trades 
certificate was included in the Northern, Taranaki, Wellington and Otago and Southland 
awards for electrical contractors and electrical supply authority workers (61, BA, 1857 ; 
61, BA, 1829). In addition, the Arbitration Court responded to the growing concern. 
In the 1961 motor trades award (61, BA, 527), the Court noted that some semi-skilled 
wage rates had increased at a faster pace than those of skilled workers. The Court made 
a substantial adjustment to skilled rates in the award to compensate for this, and indicated 
in its memorandum to the award that it was primarily motivated by a need to recognise 
the examination qualifications obtained by skilled workers employed under the award 
(principally motor mechanics). This statement pointed the way to the Court's future 
~ollcy on this iasu~- It appears that the Court subsequently decided that the most appeal-
mg ~eans of meeting the c~amour from craft unions for an increase in skill margins lay in 
special payments for qualifications held by tradesmen rather than in any significant 
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increase in the basic trades wage rate. The Court felt itself to be in a difficult position, 
and viewed the relativity implications of the issue with considerable anxiety. It is evident 
from its memoranda to subsequent margins cases that it feared any substantial increase in 
the basic trades rate, in recognition of skill, would flow out through all the different 
trades awards into the whole wage structure, and would have the same effect as a GWO. 
Accordingly, in 1962 the Court granted the first payment for trades certificate. 
Since trades certificate had no parallel in non-trades awards, there was reason to expect 
that such payments could be confined to skilled workers, and thereby serve to subdue the 
rising tide of hostility from the craft unions without triggering a relativity-based increase 
throughout the wage structure. In February 1962, the Court awarded a payment of 1.67 
cents (2d) per hour to all those tradesmen employed under the factory engineers' award 
who held a trade certificate issued by the New Zealand Trades Certificate Board (62, BA, 
129). The employer representative on the Court, Hewitt, issued a strongly dissenting 
opinion, arguing that trade certificate was not necessarily a post-apprenticeship qualifica-
tion, but merely a certificate of competency which should be recognised in the basic 
tradesman's rate. Nonetheless, the payment spread quickly throughout other trades 
awards and industrial agreements, since (as had always been the case) there was little for 
employers to gain in resisting the payment once the Court had made its policy known. 
The payment also spread almost immediately to the state sector. In June 1962, the 
Railways Industrial Tribunal followed the Court's lead and granted an application by the 
Railway Tradesmens' Association for a 2.08 cents (2~d) per hour payment for indentured 
tradesmen (Railways Industrial Tribunal, Order 435, 21 June 1962). This was a more 
generous award, in that it applied to all indentured railways tradesmen, regardless of their 
possession of any additional qualifications. Although the Tribunal intended that the pay-
ment should be confined to railways tradesmen, it soon became a standard payment for 
all state sector tradesmen, including many non-indentured craftsmen (Railways Industrial 
Tribunal, Order 462, 24 July 1963). The growth of qualification payments gathered 
further momentum in 1964. In that year payment for advanced trades certificate was 
extended for the first time to an occupation other than electricians following an agree-
ment in conciliation council to include it in the factory engineers' award (64, BA, 865). 
As had happened 2 years earlier over trades certificate, the breakthrough by factory 
engineers was quickly transmitted through to other occupations. As a result, the the 
second half of the 1960s, payments for trades and advanced trades certificate, which had 
been rarities at the beginning of the de~ade , were standard allowances in most trades 
awards and industrial agreements. 
The margins for skill cases and the tradesmen's sixpence 
The achievement of a special payment for trades and advanced trades certificate did 
little to diminish the craft unions' discontent with the compression of skill margins. Al-
though welcome in themselves, these payments failed to remedy the major problem -
the long-term decline in the tradesman's award wage rate relative to that of the unskilled 
worker. Craft union resentment at this was intensified by the existence of greater margins 
for skill in industrial agreements negotiated directly with employers. The most significant 
feature of the bargaining system in this period was the shift to direct bargaining. A variety 
of factors accounted for the growth in importance of direct bargaining and the associated 
decline of the concilation and arbitration system as the principal forum for the determina-
tion of wages and working conditions. These factors included the severe shortage of labour 
(of greatest importance) , the pace and direction of industrialisation, the related emergence 
of new workplace technologies, changing managerial practices and the reconstruction of 
the trade union movement following the 1951 debacle. Direct bargaining established 
actual rates of pay substantially above prevailing award rates. Tradesmens' wages reflected 
this general trend. Indeed, those tradesmen able to negotiate separate agreements with 
llir ~--·,·fldlll ..a 'bettlr wlth reaard to s1d11 _.. 6an ... wiM'u,... llfl ............ 1ty 1M ...._, Por the most part, the a1tl8li muglh dill not ap-
ttll _..fer dill Ia dlreDtly-neJOtiated agreemflllti1Dlttl1966 or 1961, by which 
Sllllllll,the-·COllm had been reluetantly p!Odded into action to restore award margias. 
UnioDI responded to this disparity in 2 different ways. Successive POL conferences 
taUned remits wging unions to teCUre adequate margins for skill through direct bar-
pladl1g (FOL Conference minutes, 1962, p.116 ; 1963, p.84 ; 1964, p.82). But, at the 
_. time, craft unions were encouraged into renewed efforts to secure improved award 
_,pas for skill. The national award remained, as it always had been, the basis of the 
conditions of employment for any occupation, and the benchmark from which above-
award agreements flowed. The craft unions had reason to fear, if low award margins for 
l1dl1 were to become entrenched, and even decline further, that this would eventually 
be reflected in agreements negotiated directly with employers. This fear was encouraged 
by the continued refusal of employers and the Arbitration Court to incorporate above-
award rates of pay into awards. This could only be interpreted by unions as a warning 
that those rates, and the margins for skill associated with them, were regarded as temporary 
phenomena to be tolerated only as long as the labour market required. In addition, there 
were still significant numbers of tradesmen, especially in" provincial areas, employed at or 
near the award rate, and consequently receiving award margins for skill. 
The focus of the campaign to restore award margins was initially the printers' award. 
A fierce battle was fought over the reclassification of skill categories in the 1963 printers' 
award (63, BA, 2177), and in its amendment in 1964 (64, BA, 345). The printers' union 
viewed the outcome of this as most unsatisfactory, and in March 1965 the FOL Executive 
agreed to take the printers' award to the Arbitration Court as a test case to restore award 
margins for skill. After the conciliation council preliminaries were disposed of in April 
1965, the FOL had discussions with the employers and the Court on a suitable hearing 
date. However, the judge of the Court insisted that it would not be possible to decide a 
matter of such general significance on the basis of one occupation only, and requested 
instead that the FOL bring a general case to the Court in September 1965. But before 
that case could be heard, the North Island Electrical Workers' Union presented a case 
to the Court, in which it applied for a margin of 28~ percent between the rate for elec-
trical journeymen and the average unskilled rate in a variety of awards (65, BA, 1423). 
The application was opposed by the employers, who argued that electricians should receive 
the prevailing rate of increase for trades awards, particularly in view of the forthcoming 
general case. To do otherwise, they clai!tted, would break the existing relativities between 
electricians and other occupations, and set off a chain of subsequent claims to re-establish 
that relativity. The Court accepted this argument, noting that the electricians' case could 
not be treated in isolation, and that it would be futile to establish in one individual case 
a margin for skill that would not hold, but would spread to other awards. 
Accordingly, the FOL then proceeded with the general case agreed to earlier in the 
year. The FOL's case was based upon the data referred to above which set out the decline 
in the relative position of the skilled worker since World War 1 (FOL, 1965)_2 The Pre-
sident of the FOL, Tom Skinner, asked the Court to set a wage differential of 36 percent 
between the skilled and the unskilled worker as a broad principle to serve as a guideline in 
negotiations. Skinner argued that this would restore. the margins that had prevailed before 
the intervention of SWPs. Furthermore, it would provide a satisfactory return to the 
~raft~an in compensation for training, qualifications and responsibility, and offer an 
mcentlve to school-leavers to take up apprenticeships. The New Zealand Employers 
For a further analysis of the shift to direct bargaining in the 1960s and for supporting data, see 
Walsh (1984). ' 
2. The FOL's date sJ:towed that, on 1965 wage rates, an indentured carpenter, who had completed 
5 years at apprentice rates, would need to work a further 18 years to break even with an unskilled 
dairy factory worker (FOL. 1965, p.4). 
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Federation warned the Court that it would be taking up a "grave and UD'waJTalilt 
if it ignored the economic implications of setting a 36 percent margin, and that 
the continued shortage of unskilled and semi-skilled labour, the new margin for 
not hold, as employers would be compelled to meet demands for a restoration of (NZEF, 1965). 
The Court rejected the application (with the worker representative 
strongly. dissenting) on the grounds of its relativity implications (65, BA, 21 
basis of the economic data made available to it by the Department of Statistics, 
decided that to grant the application would have "a disastrous effect upon the 
health of the country", since a general pronouncement by the Court would flow 
the wage structure. Instead, margins should be based on merit, and this could 
achieved through negotiations in individual awards between unions and em1pl<>Ye~n 
the Court in the background. 
The decision was an extraordinary about-face by the Court. It had asked the 
bring a general case as the issue was of such far-reaching significance that it could 
decided on the basis of one award. Its subsequent decision in the electricians' 
been consistent with that view. But it had then rejected the general apJDli<:ati:on 
grounds that the issue should be dealt with on an individual basis in the ne!lOtltati 
particular awards. In addition, the Court had treated the case as a General 
and had been heavily influenced by the data it had obtained on its own volition 
Department of Statistics. But this data had not been presented at the hearing, 
FOL had had no opportunity to evaluate it. The craft unions were baffled 
They condemned the Court's refusal to accept its responsibility to arbitrate and 
that margins for skill would now be a matter for union militancy. 
In 1966 the Court finally moved to restore skill margins in awards. When the 
again took the printers' award to the Court to seek a 36 percent margin, the 
indicated that it considered a 28 percent margin for skill to be appropriate, and re 
the dispute back to conciliation for the parties to settle (66, BA, 157). In March 
the Court followed this policy in arbitrating the metal trades award, where it set 
percent margin between the basic unskilled rate and the rate for a craftsman with 
certificate (66, BA, 257). The same 28 percent margin was awarded by the Court 
printers' award was again referred to it for arbitration, after the parties failed to 
conciliation (66, BA, 769). Other awards followed suit once the Court's policy had 
made clear, with some trades awards recording their highest increase in many years 
for example, electricians (66, BA, 946), factory engineers (66, BA, 1217) and bo1ilerm~ (66, BA, 545). 
The first effect of the margins for skill controversy was to undermine the co 
of craft unions in the Court and the arbitration system. The campaign to restore 
had been long and tedious for craft unions. The 28 percent margin extracted 
reluctant Court in 1966 could not completely counteract the effect of its 
willingness to act, its search for palliatives through qualification payments, its 
recognise the margins prevailing in above-award agreements, and the remarkable inc 
tency of its decisions in the margins cases of 1965. Above all, the craft unions 
confronted throughout with the disparity between award margins for skill and what 
could achieve in direct bargaining. In this sense the margins for skill issue was 
in giving a boost to the loss of trade union faith in the arbitration system during 
and in contributing to the eventual breakdown of the system at the end of the 
Craft unions had long been the great defenders of the arbitration system, but in 
period they too turned against it. 
The second effect of the margins for skill issue was more immediate but less 
In January 1967, the Railways Industrial Tribunal again followed the lead set 
Arbitration Court. It granted an extra payment of 6.25 cents (7!-Zd) per hour to 
tured railway tradesmen in order to restore margins for skill amongst railways 
to a level" comparable with that prescribed by the Arbitration Court in the previous 
(Principal Order, No. 539, 10 January 1967). This payment became generally known 
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the tradesmen's sixpence' (non-indentured - or acting - tradesmen were eligible for 1.25 
cents (1 \-ld) of the payment ; hence the gain made by indentured tradesmen amounted to 
5.0 cents or 6d per hour). As had happened with the Railways Tribunal's 1962 decision, 
the tradesmen's sixpence was quickly extended to all state sector tradesmen. Its wider 
impact was felt through the linkages between state and private sector wages and was ex-
pressed in combination with an ex gratia survey allowance granted to state sector trades-
men following the ruling rates survey in February 1970. This survey allowance was in 
compensation for a similar payment made to a minority of private sector tradesmen 
(almost exclusively those Jiving in Auckland and Wellington), supposedly for travelling 
time but in fact purely an ex gratia payment (Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry, 
1972, pp.50-1 ). Although the bulk of private sector tradesmen did not receive this pay-
ment, the practice of paying all state sector tradesmen the same rate ensured its applica-
tion throughout the state sector.3 
The combined effect of the tradesmen's sixpence and the survey allowance became a 
key factor in the operation of the bargaining system. Both payments were added to the 
wage rate that had been revealed by the ruling rate survey in order to establish the appro-
priate wage rate for state sector tradesmen. This necessarily placed state sector tradesmen 
ahead of many private sector tradesmen. To the extent that private sector tradesmen 
were then able to secure these rates, these two extra payments became included in the new 
basic rate negotiated in the private sector. The next ruling rate survey then established a 
new rate for state tradesmen that included both the effects of the tradesmen's sixpence 
and the survey allowance and the similar payments already added to the basic private 
sector rate. Despite this, the tradesmen's sixpence and the survey allowance were then 
added again to the rate revealed by the ruling rates survey to set the new state sector rate. 
Private sector unions then set about the task of securing this new rate, and the circle began 
once more. 
This circle was most directly expressed through the relationship between wages for 
private sector and state sector electricians. The wage rates paid by local electrical supply 
authorities were closely related to the increase achieved by state sector electricians ; but, 
in turn, the award for private sector electricians was closely tied to the wage rate set by 
local authorities. This came to be called the electricians' ratchet, and since the electricians' 
award was a key trendsetting award for other private sector rates, the effects of this ratchet 
became transmitted throughout the national wage structure. These 2 payments were 
prominent factors in the confusion that arose out of the leapfrogging relativity-based 
bargaining spiral of 1969-70 (and the wages spiral associated with this), and the effort 
to deal with them were matters of central concern to the administration of the wage 
restraint policies implemented from 1971 onwards (Boston, 1980 ; Walsh, 1984). 
Registration allowances and indenture payments 
Thus by the beginning of the 1970s there were 3 recently established payments in 
recognition of skill widely applicable in the private sector. Most tradesmen who were 
qualified received an allowance for trades or advanced trades certificate, while for the 
majority of tradesmen their basic wage rate incorporated compensation for the state sector 
tradesmen's sixpence. In addition, basic trades rates had been increased substantially by 
the general improvement in margins for skill. In 1971 a fourth payment for skill was 
established - an allowance for registered electricians and plumbers. 
3. The nature of the state sector wage-fixing system and its interaction with the private sector pay 
rates had bee_n a matter. of concern to employers and the Government for some time (lnterdepart-
~ental Offictals Commtttee, [~966]). The 1972 Royal Commission did not support the accusa-
~wns of state sector responsib~ty. for the emerging inflation of this period. Although it found 
mstances of state pay _leadership, 1t attributed. this principally to the pressures placed upon the 
state system by the raptdly changmg wage rates m the private sector, especially after 1969. 
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The origins of this payment lay in the relativities crisis of 1969-70. This crisis was 
triggered by a 6-week strike by Auckland electricians in the winter of 1969 in pursuit 
of a substantial increase in their regional ruling rate. The Government appointed a Com-
mittee of Inquiry, chaired by Sydney Armstrong, an industrial conciliator, which upheld 
the electricians' claim. The consequences of the Armstrong decision were immense. It 
led to a flood of claims by unions throughout 1969 and 1970 to restore relativities dis-
turbed by the electricians' settlement. A series of chain reactions ensued, with agreements 
being negotiated and renegotiated in a bewildering series of leapfrogging adjustments as 
each subsequent settlement upset existing wage relativities with other agreements. 
As a result the focus of bargaining shifted decisively away from the national award 
structure and towards agreements directly negotiated between unions and employers on 
a regional, company or enterprise basis. The chaotic way in which this was being done 
persuaded the NZEF and the FOL of the need to restore the predominance of awards as 
a basis for re-establishing on orderly bargaining environment. In 1970, they secured the 
Government's agreement to an amendment to the Industrial Concilation and Arbitration 
Act (IC,A) which authorised the Arbitration Court to amend awards during their cur-
rency following a joint application from the union and employers who were parties to the 
award. The purpose of this was to facilitate the updating of award rates of pay to the 
levels being established in directly negotiated agreements, and thus to put an end to the 
rash of leapfrogging adjustments and the conflict and instability associated with this. 
Most awards were amended along these lines during 1970 and the early months of 
1971. However, the North Island Electricial Workers' union made use of the amendment 
to secure a special qualification payment for registered electricians. Electricians had been 
seeking a registration allowance for some time. They justified their claim by reference to 
the statutory responsibilities and possible penalties imposed upon registered electricians 
by the Electricians' Act, 19 52. A registration allowance for electricians and plumbers (who 
shared similar obligations under the Plumbers' and Gasfitters' Act, 1964) had been 
included in a variation of the Manapouri Power Project Employees Industrial Agreement in 
February, 1968 (68, BA, 7). However, electricians had been quite unable to extend this 
allowance to any of the major electricians' awards. Indeed, in 1970, the Northern etc. 
electrical contractors' award specifically stated that the wage rates prescribed there took 
into account the qualifications, responsibilities and penalties imposed by the Electricians' 
Act (70, BA, 3091). Nonetheless, in March 1971 by a joint union-employer application to 
the Arbitration Court under the terms of the 1970 amendment to the IC & A Act, this 
award was amended to provide a special allowance for registered electricians in compensa-
tion for the obligations imposed on them by the Electricians' Act (71, BA, 1018). This 
payment was subsequently included in other awards for electrical contractors, electrical 
workers and supply authority electricians (71, BA at 1485 ; 1808 ; 2589 ; 3280 ; 4252). 
In addition a similar registration payment was included in the national plumbers' award 
settled in December 1971 (71, BA, 3690). 
The Engineers' union was immediately galvanised into action by the electricians' 
success in obtaining a registration allowance. Throughout the 1960s a registered elec-
trician had held a small but consistent margin over a fitter with trades certificate, which 
was the pivotal occupational category within the jurisdiction of the Engin~ers' union. 
However, the relativities crisis had eroded that margin, and by the end of 1970 a registered 
electrician and a fitter with trades certificate were on the same rate (70, BA, 3091 ; 70, 
BA, 4955). The Engineers' union was unwilling to accept the partial restoration of the 
electricians' margin through the registration allowance. The situation was made more 
complicated by the provisions of the Stabilisation of Remuneration Act which came into 
effect at this time. The Act required all wage increases of more than 7 percent to be 
approved by the Remuneration Authority. In April 1971, the Remuneration Authority 
approved the insertion of a state linkage clause in the Northern etc. electrical supply 
authorities' award (71, BA, 1485). This ensured that supply authority electricians would 
receive not only the 7 percent increase they had negotiated, but also any increase granted 
af Ul.e 81ltvey , 
tlttm tWlea ictbia4 as a mult of the rqiatratlon 
the blMk prospect of even further behiad as a reault of 
•;tdl;ilulll' awatd. The inabJ.oen' union was det411rmlned to prevent this return 
relationahip with electrldaal. and it succeaafully nqotiated a wage rate in 
(metal trallea sad factory ensmeers) to restore the fitter's parity with 
After protracted consideration, the Remuneration Authority granted a 
,,... ..... -··-· in both awards that compensated the fitter for the state linkage component 
electricians' increase, but rejected the registration allowance component (71, BA, 
; 71, BA, 4135). 
'l)roughout 1971 and 1972 the Engineers' union made it plain that it did not regard 
tfUs alteration in the relativity between a fitter and an electrician as permanent (e.g. see 
.Dominion, 11 February 1972). After the Labour Government lifted wage controls in 
:Decelnber 1972, the Engineers' union immediately instituted a campaign for an inden-
ture payment to compensate its tradesmen for the electricians' registration allowance. 
The campaign began in February 1973 with strikes by engineers in the pulp and paper 
industry and soon spread to several firms in Auckland (Dominion, 15 February 1973 ; 
New Zealand Herald, 21 February 1973). The Electricians' union disputed the basis of 
the engineers' claim, maintaining that fitters would only be entitled to a payment similar 
to the electricians' registration allowance if they were required to shoulder the same 
statutory obligations as those imposed upon electricians (New Zealllnd Herald, 28 Feb-
ruary 1973). The dispute was referred to an independent arbitrator who rejected the fit-
ters' claim for an indenture payment. The arbitrator observed that the electricians' regis-
tration allowance did not affect fitters any more than it affected dozens of other occupa-
tions, and that to grant an equivalent payment to fitters would set off a chain reaction of 
simDar claims throughout the wage structure (Auckland Star, 1 May 1973). 
In 1974, the Engineers' union tried again. On this occasion it was also motivated by 
a desire to fmd some way of circumventing the wage controls prescribed by the Wage 
Adjustment Regulations. The union secured their employers' agreem~mt to the payment 
of an indenture allowance in the negotiation of the 1974 metal trades' award. Despite 
this, the Industrial Commission rejected the joint application from the union and the em-
ployer for an exemption from the Regulations to permit its inclusion in the award (74, BA, 
577). However, in 1975 the 4 year campaign by fitters to restore their relativity with 
electricians finally bore fruit. The Industrial Commission allowed an equivalent pay-
ment in the factory engineers' award (75, BA, 51), and then explicitly recognised the 
indenture allowance in the metal trades' award later in the year (75, BA, 8849). This 
opened the way for the indenture allowance to become a generally applicable payment. 
Other unions and employers were able to cite the metal trades' case as having disturbed 
existing relativities with their own awards and agreements. The Industrial Commission, 
which was bound by the Wage Adjustment Regulations to recognise serious (i.e. relativity-
based) anomalies, was unable to reject their claims for an indenture allowance. As had 
happened with previous qualification payments, and as had been predicted by the ar-
bitrator who had rejected the Engineers' union claim in 1973, the indenture allowance 
subsequently became a standard payment in all trades awards and agreements. 
However, the logic behind this differed from that which had prevailed in the 1960s. 
Then, the emphasis had been placed firmly upon the inadequacy of skill margins. This 
remained important in the 1970s, but was coupled with a new trade union strategy to 
overcome the limits on wage increases imposed by the incomes policies implemented from 
1971 onwards. 
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Towards Kinleith : the extension of qualification payments to unqualified worken 
The second half of the 1970s saw a considerable expansion in the scope of qualifica-
tion payments. This was still related to efforts to evade wage controls, or forestall their 
reimposition, but also to the increasing complexity of workplace technologies and the 
higher levels of skill these demanded of workers. In the road transport industry, a com-
prehensi:ve review of the award for oil tanker drivers led to the inclusion of special capacity 
and ability to perform payments in the award (75, BA, 7565). A similar review of the 
general drivers' award by a joint union-employer restructuring committee recommended 
the payment of an industry allowance. As a result, a flat rate above-award payment was 
included for the first time in the 1977 award (77, BA, 6887), although this was offset 
against similar payments already being made in local ruling rate agreements. Electricians 
responded to the spread of the indenture allowance by obtaining a further payment for 
tradesmen holding a second advanced trades certificate (76, BA, 5511 ; 77, BA, 7509). 
This payment had been made to electricians employed by Tasman Pulp and Paper Com-
pany and by New Zealand Forest Products Ltd since 1968 ( 68, BA, I 096) and 1970 
(70, BA, 3894) respectively. However, these electricians also gained an indenture al-
lowance in 1975 (75, BA, 8931 ; 75, BA, 7995), despite already receiving the registration 
allowance equivalent of the indenture payment. A special payment for holders of a Marine 
Department welding certificate was included in a national award (factory engineers) for 
the first time in 1978 (78, BA, 4241), after having previously been included in agreements 
applying to particular companies or sites, especially those for contractors at the Kinleith 
and Kawerau pulp and paper mills (e.g. 77, BA, 717; 77, BA, 999). These payments were 
part of a remarkable expansion in this period of payments other than the basic wage. 
These became known as "industrial cosmetics" and included not only these, but other 
qualification payments, as well as a wide variety of special allowances for particular work-
ing conditions. 
However, the most significant development in the area of qualification payments 
stemmed from the effort to extend such payments to occupational groups not normally 
recognised as being equivalent in skill to tradesmen. Qualification payments had neces· 
sarily disturbed the existing wage relativities between tradesmen and other groups. These 
relativities were further disturbed in 1977, the first year of free bargaining after the lifting 
of wage controls , when tradesmen obtained very substantial increases in their qualifica-
tion payments. The registration allowance for electricians, first introduced in 1971, had 
risen by 36.25 percent by 1976 . But in the 1977 Northern etc. electrical contractors' 
award (77 , BA, 7203) the allowance increased by 73.40 percent (from $2.18 weekly to 
$3.78 weekly). Similarly, the indenture payment, which had remained steady at 5.0 
cents per hour in 1975 and 1976 doubled in most awards and agreements in 1977 and 
1978 [e.g. see metal trades' award, (77, BA, 7203) ; carpenters' award (77, BA, 8801) ; 
factory engineers' award (78 , BA, 4241)]. Additionally, payments for trades and advanced 
trades certificate leapt by 50 percent at the same time. 
These increases were designed , at least in part, to reward tradesmen for the negative 
effect that 6 years of wage controls had had upon skill differentials. Nonetheless some 
non-trades groups began to press for compensation for qualification payments to skilled 
workers. One such group was the Engine-Drivers' union. In 1978, it launched a campaign 
to obtain a registration allowance for boiler-attendants holding a certificate issued under 
the Boilers, Lifts and Cranes Act, 1950. Employers, fearful of the relativity implications 
of the issue, resisted the claim, arguing that the boiler-attendants' certificate could not be 
compared with the examination qualifications held by skilled tradesmen. The Govern-
ment supported the employers. In 1979, it threatened to reimpose wage controls if the 
Engine-Drivers' union continued its effort to secure a registration allowance in the award, 
and in 1980, it issued regulations under the Remuneration Act to prevent this (Roper, 
1982). However, the union was able to press its claim successfully in negotiations with 
individual employers. The ability of a small number of boiler-attendants to close down an 
enterprise gave them a strong bargaining weapon which they exploited to obtain the regis-
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tration allowance on a company-by-company basis. 
Developments within the pulp and paper industry were of much wider significance 
than the claim by boiler-attendants. In 1978, pulp and paper operators at Tasman's 
Kawerau mill lodged a claim for the restoration of the relativity they had lost with trades-
men as a result of qualification payments.4 A 6 week strike in support of the claim was 
unsuccessful. But in 1979 Tasman agreed to pay its pulp and paper operators an equivalent 
payment to the indenture allowance and to incorporate this in the operators' basic rate. 
Predictably, Tasman's tradesmen were unhappy at this, and they immediately sought an 
increase in their basic rate to compensate them for the payment to the operators. The 
ensuing strike was resolved by the extraordinary "Anzac Day settlement" of 1979. In this , 
Tasman agreed to incorporate the percentage equivalent of the indenture allowance in the 
company's basic trades rate , as well as to continue paying an additional indenture 
allowance . In addition, Tasman agreed to a "grandfather" clause, by which all tradesmen 
(and senior pulp and paper operators) were deemed to be indentured and to hold trades 
certificate, regardless of their actual qualifications. 
The Anzac Day settlement disturbed traditional relativities in 2 different ways. First , 
it shattered the horizontal relativity between companies within the pulp and paper in-
dustry. This relativity had kept the basic trades rate at Tasman and New Zealand Forest 
Products (NZFP) within 1 cent of each other throughout the 1970s. The Anzac Day 
settlement created a Tasman margin of 37 cents per hour over NZFP. Secondly the settle-
ment upset vertical relativities within Tasman. Tradesmen with indenture and trades 
certificate were brought down to the level of lesser skilled workers . The settlement ren-
dered their trades qualifications worthless to them. 
It was inevitable , given the sacred nature of relativity in New Zealand's bargaining 
system, that the 2 groups affected would insist on the restoration of these traditional 
relativities . The subsequent course of events at Tasman and NZFP, which culminated in 
the major confrontation between the Government and the combined unions of tradesmen 
at NZFP's Kinleith mill in 1980 have been well described elsewhere (Statutes Revision 
Committee, 1980 ; Roper, 1982 ; Walsh, 1983 ; Brosnan, 1983 ; Williams, 1984). The 
outcome of these events was to reestablish the traditional parity b~tween the 2 com-
panies, and to re-introduce the margins for trades qualifications within Tasman itself. 
Furthermore, the intensity and the magnitude of the Kinleith confrontation prompted a 
recognition by the Government , the FOLand the NZEF of the need to institute tripartite 
negotiations to overcome the problems in the bargaining system. These negotiations began 
in 1980 and have continued since then. 
Conclusion 
For the purposes of this article, the important consideration is the way in which the 
Kinleith confrontation, and the related events at Tasman which provoked it , derived , in 
a sense inexorably, from the interaction of 2 key characteristics of the New Zealand 
bargaining system, 1 of them - wage relativities - of longstanding duration, the other -
qualification payments - of only 20 years standing. 
The operation of the arbitration system , and in particular the crucial role played by 
SWPs, had consolidated wage relativities as the determining factor in wage settlements. 
However, it had also gradually compressed margins for skill. The latter problem could not 
easily be remedied without bringing the first issue into play and generating a ·flow-on 
~hroughout the wage structure. Accordingly, in the 1960s, qualification payments were 
mtroduced to overcome the decline in skill margins. The force of entrenched relativities 
ensured that any qualification payment, once granted to 1 group of workers spread quickly 
4. The following acc?unt is drawn largely from the report of the Statutes Revision Committee (1980) 
on the Remuneration (New Zealand Forest Products) Regulations 1980. 
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